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us when monitoring reactor activities by the observation of antineutrino emissions, one must discriminate known background reactor uxes from possible unknown reactor signals under investigation. To quantify this discrimination, we nd the con dence to reject the (null) hypothesis of a single proximal reactor, by exploiting directional antineutrino signals in the presence of a second, unknown reactor. In particular, we simulate the inverse beta decay (IBD) response of a detector lled with a 1 kT ducial mass of Gadolinium-doped liquid scintillator in mineral oil. We base the detector geometry on that of WATCHMAN, an upcoming antineutrino monitoring experiment soon to be deployed at the Boulby mine in the United Kingdom whose design and deployment will be detailed in a forthcoming white paper. From this simulation, we construct an analytical model of the IBD event distribution for the case of one 4 GWt±2% reactor 25 km away from the detector site, and for an additional, unknown, 35 MWt reactor 3 to 5 km away. e e ects of natural-background rejection cuts are approximated. Applying the model, we predict 3σ con dence to detect the presence of an unknown reactor within ve weeks, at stando s of 3 km or nearer. For more distant unknown reactors, the 3σ detection time increases signi cantly. However, the relative signi cance of directional sensitivity also increases, providing up to an eight week speedup to detect an unknown reactor at 5 km away. erefore, directionally sensitive antineutrino monitoring can accelerate the mid-eld detection of unknown reactors whose operation might otherwise be masked by more powerful reactors in the vicinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In any antineutrino reactor-monitoring scenario, observers contend with low event rates, time constraints on observation, and backgrounds both arti cial and natural. In particular, known energy-producing reactors can overwhelm signals of interest that might otherwise be observable to an antineutrino monitor. us, a nonproliferation monitoring program must characterize the requirements to detect the presence of a signi cant unknown reactor even in the vicinity of a known reactor (Figure 1 ). e WATCHMAN (Water Cherenkov Monitor for AntiNeutrinos) collaboration exists to demonstrate the utility of water Cherenkov antineutrino monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation reactor monitoring [1, 2] . As part of this collaboration's broader interest in demonstrating the utility of antineutrino monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation, we investigate a detector with equivalent geometry to the WATCH-MAN detector, but with an alternate ducial composition.
To incorporate both event-rate and directional sensitivity, we consider a 1 kT-ducial detector lled with Gadoliniumdoped liquid scintillator dissolved in mineral oil. For antineutrinos of energy less than 15 MeV, we exploit the known weak preference for backwards positron emission [3] , combined with the neutron's forward kinematics, to reconstruct a vector from the reconstructed neutron capture vertex to the centroid of positron scintillation. In the case of a single antineutrino source, the expectation direction of this vector points back towards the source reactor. e purpose of this work is to characterize the sensitivity of such a detector to resolve the presented monitoring scenario using the direction-sensitive hypothesis testing techniques presented below, and to develop a simple analytical method for modeling IBD event spatial distributions in the development of future detectors and applications. We plot the centroid of scintillation for each positron, relative to its coincident neutron capture-de ning the origin. Red error bars indicate the population standard deviation, centered on the population mean.
II. METHODS

A. Simulation and Modeling
We consider an antineutrino detector sensitive to the positron & neutron-capture double coincidence characteristic of inverse beta decay (IBD). In particular, we model the response of such a detector to multiple ssion reactors, at arbitrary positions. Applying this model, we will analyze the expected response of our detector in the presence of two reactors given azimuthal separation φ, and each i th reactor's detected integrated ux N i .
First we consider the single-reactor case, from which to construct the n-reactor case by linear superposition. Using Geant4 [5] via rat-pac [6] , we simulate the positron tracks and positron centroid vertices resulting from reactorspectrum [4] antineutrinos interacting in a 16 m × 16 m cylindrical volume of mineral oil, doped with 0.100% Gadolinium by mass and 0.177% PPO scintillator dissolved in 19.8% pseudocumene. Figure 2 shows the resulting xyprojected positron track midpoints, plo ed relative to the respective neutron capture vertices-de ning the origin. We model the distribution of these vertices by ing an uncorrelated tri-gaussian to them, thus obtaining the distribution parameters given in Table I . Herea er, we call this the "positron centroid distribution. " 
By modeling the positron centroid distribution as a single tri-gaussian, we implicitly 'average' over some higherorder corrections due to the energy dependance of the neutron thermalization length [3] . Similarly, by drawing neutron energies from a reactor IBD spectrum before neutrino oscillations, we neglect thermalization length modulations arising from those oscillations, these being higher-order corrections at the baselines under consideration ( < ∼ 0.1% e ect on time to 3σ detection). Importantly, however, we retain the primary e ect of oscillations to modulate the IBD event rate.
Given the parameters in Table I , and noting σ x ∼ = σ y ∼ = σ z ≡ σ, we therefore model the single-reactor (n=1) positron centroid distribution by,
where N is the detected integrated ux and d 3 r = dxdydz = r 2 sin θdθdφdr. By extension, the n-reactor case samples a linear combination of distributions of the same form, given by,
where µ i and σ i now denote the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the i th reactor's positron centroid distribution, along any direction. e isotropic variance of the positron centroid distribution described in Table I suggests the approximately reactor-independent magnitudes σ i ≈ σ j ≡ σ and µ i ≈ µ j ≡ µ, where i and j indicate di erent reactors.
To model the e ect of vertex position reconstruction error, we marginalize dN/d 3 r over an uncorrelated tri-gaussian with i δq i 2 = δr √ 2 and δq i ≈ δq j = δr 2/3 where δr denotes the vertex reconstruction resolution, and the factor of √ 2 arises from the geometric sum of uncorrelated errors on the two reconstructed vertices in an IBD doublecoincidence. We neglect the anisotropy of the positron midpoint reconstruction error along its scintillation track, on the grounds that, for the antineutrino energies under consideration, the positron track length is negligibly small relative to the vertex resolution itself [7] . For a reconstructed vertexr,
Finally, since we have already shown the positron centroid displacement magnitudes µ i ≈ µ j ≡ µ contain negligible reactor discriminating power, we marginalize over the radius |r| and the symmetry angle ϕ to concern ourselves only with the reconstructed polar cosine distribution, Figure 3 justi es our analytical model by showing good agreement with Monte Carlo truth prior to vertex reconstruction uncertainty.
To scale each reactor's contribution to N , neglecting core evolution, we approximate each i th reactor's mean detected IBD count N i a er a duration t as,
where ε is the total IBD detection e ciency, n p is the number of free ducial protons, L i is the propagation baseline, p i is the reactor's thermal power, = 200 MeV approximates the average ssion energy, E is antineutrino energy, σ models the IBD cross section, P ee is the electron antineutrino survival probability, and ϕ models the fractional reactor ux density [4] .
We model the IBD cross section as given in reference [8] , ) where all energies and masses are expressed in MeV. is model is accurate to within 0.5% for reactor antineutrino energies [8] , and we include this systematic uncertainty in our analysis and in Table II. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the inverted mass hierarchy case. We nd a negligible event rate discrepancy of less than 0.4% between the hierarchies. However, for the baselines under consideration, the inverted hierarchy yields up to 5% larger systematic uncertainties, so we choose it as the conservative case.
For given detected integrated uxes N i , we calculate the expected histogram by integrating (4) into bins of width ∆ cosθ as justi ed by Freedman and Diaconis [9] ,
where IQR is the interquartile range of the reconstructed polar cosine distribution. We give this histogram both total ux (correlated) and Poisson (uncorrelated) bin uncertainties. E. Caden's work on behalf of the Double Chooz collaboration demonstrates that judicious cuts can reduce natural background-induced e ects to negligible levels in directionality studies [10] . Hence the e ect of natural backgrounds is approximated through their impact on the overall detection e ciency ε.
B. Hypothesis Testing
To characterize the sensitivity of our detector to distinguishing a two-reactor scenario from the one-reactor (null) hypothesis, we consider the one-sided 95% con dence interval (CI) limit on signi cance to reject the null hypothesis, quantifying signi cance as the Z-score of the reduced chisquare test statistic [11] ,
where Φ −1 is the quantile of the standard Gaussian, and f is the χ 2 probability density function. To predict the one-sided con dence interval limit on Z with a con dence level CL, we use a conservative approximation following [12] . For an upper limit, where Z CL is the limit, and from the i th reactor N i counts the expected IBD detections with a total uncertainty δN i . For a lower limit, we reverse the inequality and subtract δN i instead. 
5
Systematic Uncertainties
Systematic uncertainties accumulate from thermal power IBD conversion, cross section uncertainties [8] , avor oscillation uncertainties, and any reactor-anomaly shi . Each of these modulates the expectation number of total IBD events in the single reactor (null) hypothesis (5). We apply the systematic uncertainties shown in Table II :
where N 1 (t) counts the expected IBD detections due to the known reactor, a er a period t. Since none of these systematics (σ s ) m exhibit angular dependence, they manifest as bin-to-bin correlated uncertainties when histogramming the null hypothesis. To accommodate bin-to-bin correlated uncertainties, we apply the generalized form of χ 2 when testing the null hypothesis,
where O j is the observed histogram, E j is the null hypothesis expectation, σ 2 kj is the covariance matrix [14] , and j, k are bin indices under Einstein summation. Figure 5 presents two-reactor scenarios, showing the superposition of these distributions for a selection of azimuthal separations φ and a xed unknown reactor stando d = 5 km.
III. RESULTS
For this scenario we assume a total IBD detection e ciency of ε = 80% a er detector losses and background rejection cuts, and a Daya Bay [15] or Double Chooz [16] -like spatial resolution of δr = 15 cm.
is justi es our previous assertion that the positron reconstruction error is only negligibly anisotropic: the entire positron scintillation track is ∼ 0.5 mm for reactor antineutrino energies [7] , which is negligible relative to this 15 cm vertex resolution. When calculating the propagation baseline for each stando , we assume a 500 m detector overburden. Larger σ values indicate a stronger signi cance to detect the unknown reactor (reject the null hypothesis). We test the two-reactor total signal (blue, le insets for detail) against the single reactor (null) hypothesis (green, center insets for detail). For completeness, we also plot the unknown-reactor signal component (red, right insets for detail). We plot only statistical uncertainties, whereas σ accounts for both systematic and statistical uncertainties.
See Appendix A for a range of azimuthal separations φ ∈ {0, π/4, π/2, 3π/4}.
shows the same for exposure to a 35 MWt ssion reactor located 5 km in the negative x-direction. Given the high-power reactor's presence is known, Figure 4 (a) depicts the null hypothesis for detection of the additional low-power reactor's presence. Figure 6 presents expected two-reactor and one-reactor reconstructed cosine histograms a er one year of monitoring, , 4, 5} km for φ ∈ {0, π}, given a known 4 GWt reactor at 25 km. We plot the lower limit of the 95% con dence interval, as integrated downward from σ = +∞, thus giving a worst-case statistical bound.
for the maximum azimuthal separation (φ = π), at unknown reactor stando s of d = 3 km and d = 5 km.
IV. DISCUSSION
For the detector under consideration, the time to achieve 3σ detection of the unknown reactor depends more strongly on the detector-reactor stando than it does on directional discrimination. Figure 7 shows that for a reactor-detector stando of 3 km, 3σ detection is likely (95% CL) within 5 weeks. However, the time required extends through 15 weeks (φ = π) to 16 weeks (φ = 0) for 4 km, and 52 weeks (φ = π) to 60 weeks (φ = 0) for 5 km. When compared to this strong stando dependence, directional discrimination plays a negligible role at 3 km, increasing towards an 8 week speedup at 5 km. We must note, however, that a detector design more optimized for direction reconstruction could provide a greater improvement in signi cance for φ > 0.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the failure to reject the null hypothesis in the absence of a second reactor. In this case, in which the null hypothesis is in fact true, the con dence interval limit begins at ∼ 1σ and decreases monotonically. is demonstrates that our method carries no bias towards falsepositive detection.
V. OUTLOOK A. Techniques
We have simulated a WATCHMAN-based detector geometry containing Gadolinium-doped liquid scintillator, and characterized its spatial IBD response to an isotropic antineutrino source. From this we have derived a statistical model describing the true detector event positions, their reconstructed vertices, and the reconstructed directionality. is statistical analysis accepts, as input parameters: the number and positions of source reactors, the true-position distributions, the achievable vertex resolution, the overall detector e ciency, and arbitrary additional correlated and uncorrelated uncertainties. We have developed a parallel-computing Mathematica [17] code to ease the e cient production of further analyses based on this statistical model. In future, we see natural applications for this model in running similar analyses on various reactor-detector con gurations.
B. Nonproliferation
We have characterized the sensitivity of a 1 kT ducial volume of GdLS mineral oil to detect the presence of a second, unknown reactor, for a range of con gurations on the ground. We have shown evidence for feasible month-scale rapid detection of an unknown, second reactor in the presence of a more powerful, known reactor, provided su cient proximity (d ≤ 3 km) to the unknown source. For more distant stando s, the time to detect increases signi cantly. We have also shown that, for our detector design, the directional sensitivity inherent to our chosen ducial material contributes only marginally in discovering an unknown reactor azimuthally separated from a known one at 3 km, but that increasing the unknown stando through 5 km increases the relative contribution of directional sensitivity, providing up to a 24% speedup for φ = π relative to φ = 0 (Figure 7) .
Looking beyond this work, it is reasonable to expect that more directionally-optimized detector con gurations may achieve the order-of-magnitude reduction in detection time required to enable month-scale monitoring for the presence of unknown reactors at farther mid-eld stando s. Future studies by the WATCHMAN collaboration will explore multidetector and segmented-detector deployments to characterize their e ectiveness at this task.
